WEBVTT

1
00:00:14.160 --> 00:00:21.900
Mark Derks: Good afternoon, everyone, my name is Mark Derks and on behalf of ACRL and Choice I'd like to welcome you to today's program.

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00:00:22.410 --> 00:00:28.740
Mark Derks: "Gone Phishing: Service Continuity, after a Cyber Attack," which is sponsored by Scholarly Network Security Initiative.

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00:00:29.400 --> 00:00:38.790
Mark Derks: Today's discussion is one in a series of sponsored webinars from Choice and ACRL that addresses new ideas developments and products of interest to the academic library community.

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00:00:39.390 --> 00:00:48.900
Mark Derks: Free to users, the structured 60 minute live presentations provide the opportunity for interactive discussions of important new issues and developments in academic librarianship.

5
00:00:49.230 --> 00:00:57.720
Mark Derks: by librarians, vendors, authors, and other interested stakeholders. Before we get started I'd like to point out just a few features of the webinar software.

6
00:00:58.320 --> 00:01:08.490
Mark Derks: First off, all of the attendees who are joining the presentation today are automatically muted and your cameras are disabled, so please don't worry about generating noise or feedback. We have that taken care of for you.

7
00:01:09.090 --> 00:01:19.980
Mark Derks: In the main area of the screen, you should be able to follow, along with the presentation materials, and we are using the Q&A feature today. If you have questions for any of our panelists.

8
00:01:21.390 --> 00:01:28.320
Mark Derks: please feel free to drop them into that Q&A box and, at the end we'll take some time to answer as many as we can get to.

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00:01:29.340 --> 00:01:38.310

Mark Derks: But often we have more questions, then we do have time to get to so we apologize in advance if we are not able to get your question in the presentation itself.

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00:01:39.780 --> 00:01:49.110
Mark Derks: also note that there is closed captioning available for today's session. If you would like to toggle that on or off, you can use the little CC button in the bottom-right.

11
00:01:49.590 --> 00:01:59.490
Mark Derks: corner of your screen to turn that on or off. If you're active on Twitter we'd also encourage you to use the hashtag #ACRLChoiceWebinars.

12
00:02:00.120 --> 00:02:15.870
Mark Derks: to live tweet the program also note that we are recording the presentation today and everyone who registered should receive a follow up email with a link to the archived version so with that we are ready to get started, and I will turn things over to good.

13
00:02:17.520 --> 00:02:26.940
Gwen Evans: Hello everyone, and thank you all for joining us today for this presentation i'd also like to thank our global attendees I'm very excited that we were able to.

14
00:02:27.360 --> 00:02:36.600
Gwen Evans: offer Spanish language translation for this. This presentation is sponsored by the Scholarly Network Security Initiative or SNSI.

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00:02:36.960 --> 00:02:41.850
Gwen Evans: And the presentation is on cyber crime and the threat it poses to libraries and their users.

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00:02:42.180 --> 00:02:49.950
Gwen Evans: I'm Gwen Evans, and I'm the Vice President of Global Library Relations at Elsevier, and I have the pleasure of representing SNSI in this session.

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00:02:50.430 --> 00:02:57.030
Gwen Evans: We're a relatively new organization, and we were set up to bring together publishers libraries and institution.

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00:02:57.510 --> 00:03:03.090
Gwen Evans: To increase awareness of the cyber challenges threatening the integrity of the scholarly record.

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00:03:03.840 --> 00:03:12.720
Gwen Evans: scholarly systems and the safety of personal data. Cyber security threats have become increasingly common, both in and outside the research enterprise.

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00:03:13.050 --> 00:03:22.530
Gwen Evans: And it's something to which the education sector is, unfortunately, particularly vulnerable, for example, the national cyber security Center in the UK.

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00:03:22.830 --> 00:03:36.930
Gwen Evans: places the education sector as the third largest target target for attacks ahead of retail, this is due to the fact that most universities routinely store a tremendous amount of personal data.

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00:03:38.040 --> 00:03:46.890
Gwen Evans: Not long ago, the City of London police issued a statement specifically warning universities have a threat posed by the paper sharing site Sci-Hub.

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00:03:47.340 --> 00:03:56.130
Gwen Evans: Sci-Hub obtains academic papers through a variety of duplicitous means, such as the use of phishing emails to trick university staff.

24
00:03:56.520 --> 00:04:06.090
Gwen Evans: and students into divulging their login credentials. Given this threat London police went so far as to advise it departments to block the website.

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00:04:06.750 --> 00:04:22.590
Gwen Evans: In order to make mitigate the security risk to the institutions and their students faculty and staff Manchester university and University College London amongst them have done this, as well as other universities and.

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00:04:24.030 --> 00:04:37.440
Gwen Evans: The Washington Post reported on the US justice department's investigation into Sci-Hub which includes both criminal

and national security implications as the question is whether Sci-Hub is tied to Russian military intelligence.

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00:04:38.160 --> 00:04:52.650
Gwen Evans: Week defenses on campuses can and do invite attacks and many it organizations are instituting regular security audits that may disrupt service or end in a ban on particular core applications that libraries depend on.

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00:04:53.400 --> 00:05:02.460
Gwen Evans: There are some complex and vexing issues around securing library and other systems: transparency, confidentiality, and privacy concerns.

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00:05:02.910 --> 00:05:07.890
Gwen Evans: are balanced with the IT infrastructures needed to protect campus and personal data.

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00:05:08.490 --> 00:05:18.900
Gwen Evans: Service disabling attacks can come from very sophisticated sources. In my previous role as the Executive Director of the State library agency OhioLink.

31
00:05:19.140 --> 00:05:29.220
Gwen Evans: I once got a call from the governor's CIO asking why one of our on-premises library-specific software servers was trying to call North Korea.

32
00:05:29.940 --> 00:05:36.660
Gwen Evans: On the other hand, service disabling events involving a variety of cybercrime, can also be on a much smaller scale.

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00:05:37.020 --> 00:05:52.440
Gwen Evans: As the head of library IT at one university I worked for, an embezzlement arrest resulted in significant disruption, as the fraud involved eBay. Servers, hard drives, and applications were disabled or seized until the investigation was concluded.

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00:05:53.460 --> 00:06:04.410
Gwen Evans: library operations are now so woven into other digital and network services on campus that attacks or breaches can have profound effects on all library operations and personnel.

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00:06:05.220 --> 00:06:16.050
Gwen Evans: Publishers and Librarians and successfully work together before, for example on CrossRef, SeamlessAccess.org and, most recently, GetFTR.

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00:06:16.500 --> 00:06:26.670
Gwen Evans: We believe such collaboration can reap benefits here too. The first step is awareness of the issues and the very real implications for libraries and our users.

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00:06:26.970 --> 00:06:36.930
Gwen Evans: These problems can't be solved in isolation, it requires collaboration amongst service and data providers Librarians and the IT organizations on campus.

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00:06:37.320 --> 00:06:50.790
Gwen Evans: To this end, SNSI is proud to sponsor this panel of Librarians who will give their personal and institutional experiences with cyber security related attacks and now I'll hand it over to Melissa DeWitt to start us off.

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00:06:53.700 --> 00:06:55.110
Melissa DeWitt: Thank you so much Gwen.

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00:06:56.250 --> 00:07:08.880
Melissa DeWitt: And I do want to start off by introducing myself, my name is Melissa DeWitt, I am a research and instruction librarian at Regis university and I am going to moderate our panel today.

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00:07:09.270 --> 00:07:18.420
Melissa DeWitt: I do want to start by thinking ACRL-Choice for hosting our webinar and giving us this space to talk about what we consider to be an important and.

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00:07:19.920 --> 00:07:32.610
Melissa DeWitt: really relevant issue to each of us and a huge Thank you to Gwen and SNSI for sponsoring this event and giving us the space to tell our stories and then also shout out to Lisa for.

43
00:07:33.390 --> 00:07:45.720
Melissa DeWitt: Finding us. We had proposed this elsewhere and were rejected, so finding this space for us in putting this together we're very excited to be here today and to share stories with all of you.

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00:07:48.210 --> 00:07:57.090
Melissa DeWitt: So, just a quick overview before we get into each of our questions today our panelists will each introduce themselves in a moment.

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00:07:57.570 --> 00:08:05.820
Melissa DeWitt: The way that this will work is i'm going to ask four questions about their cybersecurity experience and they will have a few minutes to respond.

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00:08:06.120 --> 00:08:23.640
Melissa DeWitt: And we'll also do a Q&A at the end, so if you do have questions feel free to use the Q&A box or hold onto them at the end of the session so we can answer them. And without further ado, I will take us to our panel and our questions.

47
00:08:26.340 --> 00:08:41.130
Melissa DeWitt: So for our first question i'm going to have each of our panelists introduce themselves and then take us through the cybersecurity event or the cyber attack that they experienced that they're here to speak about today.

48
00:08:43.410 --> 00:08:48.960
Melissa DeWitt: So, to start with Erin, could you please introduce yourself and talk about the cyber event.

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00:08:50.460 --> 00:09:01.560
Erin McCaffrey: Certainly Hello everyone, my name is Erin McCaffrey I'm dean of the library and director of the Center for student success at Regis University, which is located in Denver Colorado.

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00:09:02.070 --> 00:09:09.990
Erin McCaffrey: I have oversight for the library, the learning Commons and our student disability services and university testing departments.

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00:09:10.650 --> 00:09:17.250
Erin McCaffrey: Regis university was cyber attack in the early hours of August 22 2019.

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00:09:17.820 --> 00:09:25.740
Erin McCaffrey: All of our technology systems were brought down as a precautionary measures so that included phones email our website.

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00:09:26.100 --> 00:09:33.960
Erin McCaffrey: Online programs, and we were not able to use any university owned computer hardware for quite some time.

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00:09:34.590 --> 00:09:48.570
Erin McCaffrey: The attack occurred as our summer courses were coming to an end, and it was also moving day where residential students were returning to campus so it was a busy busy time leading up to the start of our fall terms.

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00:09:49.140 --> 00:10:00.180
Erin McCaffrey: As a result of the cyber attack our summer courses were extended for a week classes for our residential students started on August 26 as planned.

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00:10:00.900 --> 00:10:12.060
Erin McCaffrey: With our residential wi fi network being restored a few days later, and then our online courses and our accelerated term courses were delayed by about a week.

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00:10:12.510 --> 00:10:20.100
Erin McCaffrey: So our online learning management system was restored on September 1 and then those classes began on September 3.

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00:10:20.790 --> 00:10:31.680
Erin McCaffrey: The University also relatively quickly established an alternate website that they could use to start to communicate information out to the university community.

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00:10:32.190 --> 00:10:41.430
Erin McCaffrey: At the time of the cyber attack, we had approximately 100 applications or services that were regularly being used across the university.

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00:10:41.670 --> 00:10:49.950
Erin McCaffrey: With almost 200 servers in our data Center that we're supporting those so all of that was brought down when the cyber attack occurred.

61
00:10:50.520 --> 00:11:02.190

Erin McCaffrey: About five months after the attack, we learned that it was indeed a ransomware attack and the university did pay the hackers there's no evidence that our data was compromised.

62
00:11:02.670 --> 00:11:12.630
Erin McCaffrey: In the attack and there were federal and third party investigators that were involved, they were unable to determine the root cause, but we know that.

63
00:11:13.380 --> 00:11:25.950
Erin McCaffrey: It originated outside of the United States, and one thing that I will be curious in hearing from our other panelists as well for us at Regis the they attacked our backups first.

64
00:11:26.220 --> 00:11:34.950
Erin McCaffrey: So our institutional continuity plans that were already in place, were based on having those backups and, since those were compromised in the attack.

65
00:11:35.850 --> 00:11:52.080
Erin McCaffrey: It resulted in our IT department, making the decision to rebuild and update systems, so our recovery was quite long because we had to take that approach and I'll speak more to those after effects as we continue through the panel today.

66
00:11:55.020 --> 00:12:09.120
Melissa DeWitt: Thank you Erin and that sufficiently stressed me out all over again, so thank you for taking us through that and I am excited to hear from Romel next please introduce yourself and take us through your experience.

67
00:12:10.950 --> 00:12:35.790
Romel Espinel: My name is from Romel Espinel. I am the Web services and instruction I librarian at Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken New Jersey, just so that Just to give you context Stevens is a science and engineering school, it has a population of 3791 undergrads about 3500 grads and probably.

68
00:12:36.810 --> 00:12:48.870
Romel Espinel: Around 330 faculty and 600 and about 620 staff members, so our cyber attack happened around August 8 and a lot of these things are going to be kind of similar.

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00:12:49.560 --> 00:13:00.870

Romel Espinel: In that, in the proximity of where when these attacks happen in the academic calendar year instead it's up especially how they happened, around this time, so our attack happened in August 8.

70
00:13:02.100 --> 00:13:04.110
Romel Espinel: but, you know August 8 of 2019.

71
00:13:05.550 --> 00:13:12.390
Romel Espinel: where approximately 75 campus members and encountered a ransom message upon logging into the Stevens network.

72
00:13:13.470 --> 00:13:20.310
Romel Espinel: so subsequently IT shut down everything to contain the attack then make plans with campus partners to get back up.

73
00:13:21.030 --> 00:13:27.660
Romel Espinel: The library was really involved in the triage unit, as our technical infrastructure is really important to the students, especially.

74
00:13:28.590 --> 00:13:43.680
Romel Espinel: As they got back to school our immediate and my job in all this was really to communicate out to our students, because we were--this was about three weeks before classes were about to start.

75
00:13:44.400 --> 00:13:53.490
Romel Espinel: Probably around we usually start around August 29, and so we were trying to assess really as possible to get to get some.

76
00:13:54.210 --> 00:14:04.080
Romel Espinel: You know of our technical infrastructure back because everything was shut down, you couldn't print you, couldn't scan, you couldn't use computers on campus and so forth.

77
00:14:04.890 --> 00:14:17.070
Romel Espinel: So we were just bare bone in it until we we got clearance that some of our our technology was back, we weren't the school was able to get back online.

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00:14:17.520 --> 00:14:22.500
Romel Espinel: wi fi by the time to start of school, but there were so many things that.

79
00:14:23.310 --> 00:14:36.630
Romel Espinel: Just needed to get back into place mostly of hardware issues, because, as I mentioned, you know with all those students and faculty and staff members every computer had to take it offline scanned and made sure that there wasn't.

80
00:14:37.740 --> 00:14:51.450
Romel Espinel: You know, viruses on it so that took a long time and and we were still feeling the effects of it up until the beginning of the pandemic, which was great, why not jump from one crisis to the next crisis so.

81
00:14:52.200 --> 00:14:58.620
Romel Espinel: that's basically what where we were, and we were we were still i'll get it a little bit more into the details.

82
00:14:59.880 --> 00:15:02.010
Romel Espinel: With our next question, thank you.

83
00:15:03.750 --> 00:15:10.140
Melissa DeWitt: Thank you really interesting to hear how many similarities, there were, between those two experiences.

84
00:15:11.850 --> 00:15:24.990
Melissa DeWitt: i'm going to transition to Kristina our last panelist and I intentionally had you go last because you have a little bit of a different experience, but I think is really important to share for folks who are at this webinar today.

85
00:15:25.650 --> 00:15:30.690
Melissa DeWitt: So could you also introduce yourself and then take us through the event that you experienced.

86
00:15:31.740 --> 00:15:40.650
Kristina Vela Bisbee: Sure, so hi everyone i'm Christina villages be i'm the journalism and government information librarian at Columbia.

87
00:15:41.490 --> 00:16:00.870
Kristina Vela Bisbee: In this position, I searched the social sciences and specifically the Department of political science and for the purpose of this talk the really important part of my job is that I am a main coordinator of electronic resources in my subject area which, as I mentioned, is political science.

88
00:16:02.160 --> 00:16:14.820
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So in 2019 so May 2019 hackers attempted to gain access to and alter military intelligence that was provided to Columbia by the libraries.

89
00:16:15.150 --> 00:16:23.940
Kristina Vela Bisbee: They did this by impersonating a Columbia student and using the library's various channels for research support to gain access.

90
00:16:24.330 --> 00:16:32.730
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So, in other words, very channels that we use to make ourselves accessible to our users virtual reference email reference web forms.

91
00:16:33.120 --> 00:16:45.810
Kristina Vela Bisbee: Our reliance on these channels are what made us vulnerable to this attack, so this database was also prominently featured in our library guides and our publicly indexed website.

92
00:16:47.010 --> 00:16:49.950
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So I can't say which database, this is.

93
00:16:51.180 --> 00:17:08.040
Kristina Vela Bisbee: But it's not your typical library vendor it's an industry database it's very useful for faculty who are experts in international affairs and political science, but it's probably not very useful for your typical undergrad who's thinking about majoring in policy.

94
00:17:09.390 --> 00:17:21.300
Kristina Vela Bisbee: But if your library serves a law school or a law firm a Business School a hospital or a Medical School This is something that could happen to you if you're providing specialized resources.

95
00:17:22.230 --> 00:17:33.420
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So in 2019 the libraries learned that someone claiming to be a Columbia student was trying to access the database by contacting our vendor directly, so they.

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00:17:33.990 --> 00:17:40.830

Kristina Vela Bisbee: were essentially saying hello i'm a student I am trying to get access to your resources, can you please help me.

97
00:17:41.670 --> 00:17:50.880
Kristina Vela Bisbee: In a CCD email between myself the vendor and the student, it was disclosed that I was the primary contact for relations between this database and the university.

98
00:17:51.660 --> 00:18:01.410
Kristina Vela Bisbee: In a separate email thread between just myself and the vendor they told me that they believed the attacker was spoofing the university's IP IP address.

99
00:18:01.800 --> 00:18:15.600
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So, for those of you who don't know what spoofing is it's the process of imitating somebody's IP address in order to gain access to otherwise inaccessible content it's what libraries will often use to verify someone's affiliation.

100
00:18:16.710 --> 00:18:26.490
Kristina Vela Bisbee: And it's what we were pretty sure that that's how hackers sort of gained access to the email account, which was then used to offer legitimacy to this person's request.

101
00:18:27.840 --> 00:18:38.970
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So first they emailed me directly, and as I sort of ignored their requests they then began to email other Librarians at our institution.

102
00:18:39.600 --> 00:18:45.270
Kristina Vela Bisbee: And drop my name to give sort of like leverage to the requests that they were making.

103
00:18:46.110 --> 00:18:55.500
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So I have a few links here to some screenshots of some of the different interactions that we had with this person i'm going to go ahead and drop them into the chat.

104
00:18:55.770 --> 00:19:04.890
Kristina Vela Bisbee: Let me know if you can't see them or there's problems with accessing those and I can make sure that they are uploaded as a part of some of the resources for this panel.

105

00:19:06.420 --> 00:19:16.170
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So you can see here in this image, you know they're calling me out specifically as somebody who they've spoken with who should provide them with access.

106
00:19:16.530 --> 00:19:24.720
Kristina Vela Bisbee: And I had seen sort of my fair share of Trolls and hackers, but this was on a very different level.

107
00:19:25.560 --> 00:19:36.000
Kristina Vela Bisbee: The way that you know these communications would go, they would identify themselves as an affiliate they would then send a copy of their fake student ID as proof of who they are.

108
00:19:36.810 --> 00:19:46.740
Kristina Vela Bisbee: They would drop my name and then they would make this request for information, so I also have an image here of a fairly convincing.

109
00:19:47.310 --> 00:19:55.140
Kristina Vela Bisbee: spoof to user ID which they used it's not completely accurate and a lot of the parts of our ID card have since changed.

110
00:19:55.860 --> 00:20:06.540
Kristina Vela Bisbee: But the kinds of requests we were getting with things like high resolution images of aircraft carriers or maps of military bases.

111
00:20:07.200 --> 00:20:16.260
Kristina Vela Bisbee: In several instances, there were requests that we actually reach out to the vendor to change or alter information in this database.

112
00:20:16.620 --> 00:20:24.210
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So, for example, technical specifications for drones and surveillance devices being used in the Middle East.

113
00:20:25.170 --> 00:20:36.210
Kristina Vela Bisbee: The main thing that sort of changed between these sort of general asks and something very specific is that once they got the attention of somebody who was sort of live and willing to talk to them.

114
00:20:36.600 --> 00:20:43.050
Kristina Vela Bisbee: They were then willing to sort of get very specific about what they needed and became very urgent about about these requirements.

115
00:20:44.880 --> 00:20:49.710
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So I also have a link here to.

116
00:20:50.970 --> 00:21:01.380
Kristina Vela Bisbee: To give you sort of an example of what it is that they were looking at looking for so again, I want to reiterate here that academics, they they're not the primary users of this database.

117
00:21:01.980 --> 00:21:09.450
Kristina Vela Bisbee: Its Defense contractors and security intelligence firms, however, this resource was really a feather in the libraries hat.

118
00:21:09.750 --> 00:21:21.870
Kristina Vela Bisbee: This was our way of showing that we are legitimate to our users, that we have a lot of leverage and our ability to sort of give our users what they need in order to do good scholarship.

119
00:21:22.770 --> 00:21:30.420
Kristina Vela Bisbee: And it was also something that we had been using for a very long time, without any issue, so this was something that kind of blindsided us.

120
00:21:34.020 --> 00:21:35.940
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So I want to sort of sum it up.

121
00:21:37.350 --> 00:21:42.690
Kristina Vela Bisbee: These hackers had a combination of institutional knowledge and technical skills that they're disposable.

122
00:21:43.320 --> 00:21:50.010
Kristina Vela Bisbee: We received about 20 individual referrals from the same user and those came through a variety of channels.

123
00:21:50.310 --> 00:22:00.900

Kristina Vela Bisbee: So they were emailing individual Librarians they were emailing different campus Librarians of which we have libraries, excuse me, of which we have about 20 different locations on campus.

124
00:22:01.200 --> 00:22:09.630
Kristina Vela Bisbee: They were filling out online reference help forms, at one point on an email thread, I was on this email thread with the student and three other campus Librarians.

125
00:22:09.990 --> 00:22:19.200
Kristina Vela Bisbee: Most chilling to me was actually their usage of our chat reference, so they were speaking to a librarian in real time and troubleshooting access.

126
00:22:19.620 --> 00:22:33.480
Kristina Vela Bisbee: Because our library system is so decentralized some of these attempts came pretty close to a security breach, especially when the hacker was speaking with students or staff who don't normally work with patrons in this area and therefore may not have recognized the threat.

127
00:22:34.590 --> 00:22:43.470
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So, as I mentioned, we had about 20 different referrals from the same user through a variety of channels over the course of two weeks, so it was a very sort of.

128
00:22:43.710 --> 00:22:50.460
Kristina Vela Bisbee: abbreviated and intense amount of time in which they were sort of testing all over our defenses and seeing if they could get in.

129
00:22:51.960 --> 00:23:01.350
Kristina Vela Bisbee: As I was sort of fielding inquiries from admin and Librarians and our IT staff we're basically things got quiet for a month after we started ignoring them.

130
00:23:02.040 --> 00:23:12.630
Kristina Vela Bisbee: And then things picked back up as we started the fall semester, at which point we canceled our subscription and I could talk a little bit more about that later on in the panel.

131
00:23:15.300 --> 00:23:24.090

Melissa DeWitt: Thank you Kristina. It strikes me how elaborate all of that became over time in the ways that they attempted to get access to this information.

132
00:23:25.020 --> 00:23:35.730
Melissa DeWitt: So, now that we have a little bit of context for what happens and sort of what the situation was for each of us, I am curious about what came next really if anything.

133
00:23:36.420 --> 00:23:49.800
Melissa DeWitt: So if you could speak to the immediate impacts in the long term repercussions on services and your institutions operations and you might also consider while thinking about this question too.

134
00:23:50.310 --> 00:24:01.830
Melissa DeWitt: Ways you tried to provide services, despite all of this chaos and district disruption as well, so we're going to change the order of just slightly and I'm going to ask Romel to take the first question.

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00:24:02.940 --> 00:24:09.720
Romel Espinel: Okay, so let me just okay so like I mentioned before all our systems are shut down.

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00:24:10.140 --> 00:24:21.240
Romel Espinel: And so, like you know, like like we said, like there was no wi fi there was no hardware, there was no was you know basically no software, the only things that were eight we were able to work on where things that we.

137
00:24:21.690 --> 00:24:30.690
Romel Espinel: Basically, had outsourced or or the university had Apps or so, like our website our website wasn't down because we had outsource you know our server.

138
00:24:31.170 --> 00:24:48.810
Romel Espinel: To to a third party provider so that's a good thing, because then you're able to communicate with your campus you know what's going on, and you know what's getting back online so, but you know everything had to be shut down everything from you know our public computers or public computers.

139
00:24:50.130 --> 00:25:02.070

Romel Espinel: our scanners our printers our wi fi network for a long you know, while we were coming into work, while the hack was going on IT and the administration was trying to figure out.

140
00:25:03.510 --> 00:25:11.910
Romel Espinel: was trying to figure out how to bring things back up to date, we were basically working off our phones wi fi and you know to connect our computers.

141
00:25:12.300 --> 00:25:30.390
Romel Espinel: Whoever had a clear computer because basically at this point the university was starting to collect computers everyone's computers to have been scanned and clear, which was a really slow and arduous process and everybody has different computers and PCs and MACs and so forth, so.

142
00:25:31.590 --> 00:25:36.390
Romel Espinel: So everything, including interlibrary loan I'm going to share.

143
00:25:38.070 --> 00:25:46.890
Romel Espinel: My a link to kind of our communications page that we had running up on our on our library site and you could kind of see.

144
00:25:47.430 --> 00:26:06.630
Romel Espinel: If you start at the bottom that's that's the earliest update we had started around August 16 you can see that, where we communicate to everyone had access to library services and resources like research databases interlibrary loan the library catalog everything is unavailable.

145
00:26:07.650 --> 00:26:12.180
Romel Espinel: And then some delays by August 26 we we start to establish.

146
00:26:13.830 --> 00:26:22.530
Romel Espinel: database access again just because we were able to reconnect to your easy proxy so that people get into databases and our catalogs.

147
00:26:24.210 --> 00:26:30.180
Romel Espinel: You can see that you know duck bills, which is kind of like the way that students pay for things on campus was reestablished.

148
00:26:30.570 --> 00:26:41.430
Romel Espinel: ILL came back and so forth, but at this time we're still trying to figure out how to get people how to get students access to be able to like print or scan.

149
00:26:41.760 --> 00:26:54.720
Romel Espinel: or even to use some computers in the library so by August 29 I think we start book checkout is starting to come back you know, trying to get our circulation desk workstation working.

150
00:26:56.010 --> 00:27:06.330
Romel Espinel: Our computers, some computers are back, but not-- not many we're starting to refer people to public you know the Hoboken public library, which is a library that's really close by.

151
00:27:08.220 --> 00:27:19.380
Romel Espinel: And then around September 25 you know basically a month and a half, almost two months, you know we finally get get printing available on campus but.

152
00:27:20.070 --> 00:27:30.930
Romel Espinel: Just to two computers so basically we set up a printing station for two computers to be able to print luckily luckily at a stem school, most people don't print.

153
00:27:32.070 --> 00:27:47.640
Romel Espinel: You know papers, as much as other schools, but they still need them, because we have job fairs and stuff and people have to print resumes and so forth, so printing is really still important as we get into December 2 in your you know we.

154
00:27:49.080 --> 00:27:58.860
Romel Espinel: We went through a whole October November, without any kind of updates until we were really starting to get back everything back up to date and December 4 were.

155
00:27:59.520 --> 00:28:06.330
Romel Espinel: Almost back up to normal, you know just because we're able to get back a lot of our computers and so forth.

156
00:28:06.780 --> 00:28:16.500

Romel Espinel: So, as you can see it by the timelines we started in August and we're going into December and and just to let you know that a lot of.

157
00:28:17.040 --> 00:28:27.360
Romel Espinel: Our computers our computers our personal computers were taken away, and you know, like we're being scanned there's a process order that's been being put into place.

158
00:28:28.710 --> 00:28:30.840
Romel Espinel: You know, like for the library.

159
00:28:33.030 --> 00:28:37.860
Romel Espinel: The Director and myself had to get back our computers immediately, so that we can be able to distribute.

160
00:28:39.270 --> 00:28:44.790
Romel Espinel: information to the rest of the campus and about the library and stuff so.

161
00:28:46.170 --> 00:29:02.790
Romel Espinel: let's see, and so the only things that were really up and running for us were of course the things ever run on third parties, like our library website LibGuides LibAnswers you know, so we were able to still chat from our from our from our website.

162
00:29:03.810 --> 00:29:14.640
Romel Espinel: One thing that was difficult to do with to at that time is that we still had to come into work and come into work, and you know kind of like do things without.

163
00:29:15.030 --> 00:29:23.160
Romel Espinel: computers and wi fi and and and and the things that we take you know take for granted that we're working on every single day.

164
00:29:23.520 --> 00:29:34.230
Romel Espinel: So we had to find other projects to do so, you know if we if we needed to make new signs and stuff like that we had to make new signs and and so forth, so it does become a.

165
00:29:35.550 --> 00:29:50.310
Romel Espinel: very complicated matter when when you're trying to figure out these things and you're kind of in the dark of where where

things up it's not like things turn on automatically it's like slowly things are coming back on maybe like similar to like a blackout.

166
00:29:51.990 --> 00:29:52.320
Romel Espinel: Then.

167
00:29:53.460 --> 00:30:02.940
Romel Espinel: And just just to make a note again about about the timeline is that, even going into January 2020 many a couple of our.

168
00:30:03.780 --> 00:30:23.610
Romel Espinel: library staff members hadn't gotten their computers back and actually one thing that we realized is that over the last couple years before the attack our IT department had gone through a large restructuring and so many people who used to be there weren't there and and so.

169
00:30:25.410 --> 00:30:36.060
Romel Espinel: The systems administration was really unclear and so sometimes are we had computers, like my computer in my my office, I had a PC also.

170
00:30:37.290 --> 00:30:39.150
Romel Espinel: which had an administrator password.

171
00:30:40.470 --> 00:30:41.760
Romel Espinel: No one knew that password.

172
00:30:42.900 --> 00:30:50.970
Romel Espinel: And so we couldn't even get into certain computers. So remember, write down your administrative passwords because.

173
00:30:52.110 --> 00:31:05.040
Romel Espinel: IT might not have it, especially if they've gone through a large turnover people in their department So these are all things that we were trying to do at same time provide the services like research instruction.

174
00:31:06.120 --> 00:31:08.310
Romel Espinel: database electronic services to everyone.

175
00:31:09.660 --> 00:31:10.020

Romel Espinel: that's it.

176
00:31:11.760 --> 00:31:25.710
Melissa DeWitt: Thank you, and this isn't going to be a strong enough word but that sounds challenging, to put it very, very lightly to work through that environment which I think we'll talk about a little more and our next question to on how that felt.

177
00:31:27.390 --> 00:31:41.100
Melissa DeWitt: I am going to ask Christina the same question what were the immediate impacts and if any long term repercussions on services in your institutions operations you already briefly mentioned you canceled the database.

178
00:31:42.210 --> 00:31:47.730
Kristina Vela Bisbee: yeah so the ultimate repercussion is that we ended up canceling our subscription.

179
00:31:48.870 --> 00:32:00.720
Kristina Vela Bisbee: We were able to find a comparable resource, with an academic vendor that we had had a long standing relationship with the resource isn't like as hot as the one that we canceled.

180
00:32:02.040 --> 00:32:11.220
Kristina Vela Bisbee: And this isn't necessarily the ideal outcome, but because the threat was so coordinated, and it was so relentless and.

181
00:32:12.000 --> 00:32:20.310
Kristina Vela Bisbee: It just it gave me like creepy crawly feelings we're going to talk about that, and the other question, but it was very clear to me that.

182
00:32:20.820 --> 00:32:35.250
Kristina Vela Bisbee: This sort of like response or attack was going to continue to happen in some form or fashion and we simply did not have the infrastructure in place to counter that kind of attack.

183
00:32:36.210 --> 00:32:45.390
Kristina Vela Bisbee: I... Immediate impacts? I got to speak with a lot of staff I don't normally talk to on a normal day so that was really nice.

184

00:32:46.620 --> 00:32:55.560
Kristina Vela Bisbee: You know, there were conversations sort of like up the chain across the system with both IT departments inside and outside the library.

185
00:32:56.550 --> 00:33:07.380
Kristina Vela Bisbee: And so it was there was sort of like a coordinated response, the best that we could sort of in the moment it included access staff IT staff our collections department.

186
00:33:08.370 --> 00:33:24.750
Kristina Vela Bisbee: And we had sort of the same sort of unified response, which is do not engage if we can't stop these people from reaching out to us, then we simply need to keep them at bay, by not feeding the Trolls, as they say.

187
00:33:25.800 --> 00:33:37.740
Kristina Vela Bisbee: At one point, I sent out an all staff email to the library everyone in the library, which was not ideal, but I was getting emails from everyone across the library system people I had had never met.

188
00:33:38.340 --> 00:33:46.770
Kristina Vela Bisbee: Who were saying that they were receiving these requests and that my name had been dropped and they just wanted to know if they had spoken to this person.

189
00:33:48.240 --> 00:34:00.660
Kristina Vela Bisbee: And so yeah I had to sort of I had to sort of be the person who would take action, because there was also a lot of sort of like throwing the ball from like one person or one department to the next.

190
00:34:01.350 --> 00:34:16.050
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So, because it had to do with the university's ID system, the registrar and like CU-IT were kind of involved because it had to do with a database that the library subscribe to our collections folks were involved.

191
00:34:16.890 --> 00:34:23.160
Kristina Vela Bisbee: And nobody was really willing to take responsibility for making sort of.

192
00:34:23.520 --> 00:34:31.860

Kristina Vela Bisbee: A change in access it's also important to note that the students that were being impersonated because it was more than one it was multiple students, that they were impersonating.

193
00:34:32.820 --> 00:34:44.730
Kristina Vela Bisbee: They were current affiliates at the University, they were not like made up students with made up identities, these were people who were actively enrolled or staff members at our institution.

194
00:34:45.330 --> 00:35:03.330
Kristina Vela Bisbee: And so it created just a very sticky and difficult situation for us, and there were no sort of clear directions about where we were supposed to go from there, I also contacted the FBI and let them know. I have not heard back from them.

195
00:35:04.530 --> 00:35:08.160
Kristina Vela Bisbee: If anybody is listening I'm available if you would like to chat.

196
00:35:11.790 --> 00:35:18.690
Melissa DeWitt: Thank you Christina sounds messy and yeah if anyone has contacts to look into it shout out.

197
00:35:19.800 --> 00:35:25.470
Melissa DeWitt: And then we'll round off this question with Erin, same question for you.

198
00:35:25.920 --> 00:35:33.240
Erin McCaffrey: Thank you um, so I think some of our experience mirrors a little bit what Romel described, but we also have some.

199
00:35:33.750 --> 00:35:46.980
Erin McCaffrey: Differences as well um the immediate impacts, you know really the first few days were just filled with a lot of confusion and shock and lack of clarity about what was actually going on until we--

200
00:35:47.250 --> 00:35:57.030
Erin McCaffrey: It was confirmed that it was a cyber attack and we had to go analog on many things, so you know as the start of our semester.

201
00:35:57.300 --> 00:36:02.910

Erin McCaffrey: A lot of us had instructions sessions that had been scheduled, we had to find ways to.

202
00:36:03.270 --> 00:36:12.030
Erin McCaffrey: connect with those faculty to see if and how we were going to try to do this without knowing you know, the state of our resources at that point in time.

203
00:36:12.480 --> 00:36:17.280
Erin McCaffrey: So there was a lot of just walking across campus hoping to bump into someone.

204
00:36:18.060 --> 00:36:29.160
Erin McCaffrey: slipping notes under office doors trying to find colleagues on social media and message them that way just kind of any way, we could think of to connect with other people.

205
00:36:29.670 --> 00:36:41.550
Erin McCaffrey: And at the institutional level everything initially was focused on our students and being able to start classes and getting our physical and virtual classrooms running.

206
00:36:42.000 --> 00:36:50.610
Erin McCaffrey: So that was good, but then it was extremely challenging that we had no access to our online library of resources, as the Semester was.

207
00:36:50.970 --> 00:36:57.450
Erin McCaffrey: kicking off and even though the learning management system was brought back online relatively quickly.

208
00:36:57.810 --> 00:37:06.690
Erin McCaffrey: None of the links within the LMS to other university systems were functioning so any library database links or.

209
00:37:07.080 --> 00:37:20.250
Erin McCaffrey: ebook links are electronic reserve system, none of those links were functioning, because all that access was still unavailable so it was about a week after the cyber attack that our it department.

210
00:37:20.670 --> 00:37:35.550

Erin McCaffrey: began the process of starting to scan all the university owned computers, so that was the initial step to the eventual restoration of faculty and staff computers Macs were restored relatively quickly.

211
00:37:36.420 --> 00:37:45.750
Erin McCaffrey: Anyone with a PC those were under quarantine for much longer, so our first post went up on our library blog with.

212
00:37:46.350 --> 00:37:55.800
Erin McCaffrey: links to alternative open access resources, about a week or 10 days after the cyber attack, as we you know new.

213
00:37:56.490 --> 00:38:04.200
Erin McCaffrey: Okay, things are going to be disrupted for here for a while, so all of our Librarians got to work developing.

214
00:38:04.980 --> 00:38:14.790
Erin McCaffrey: lists of other information resources that at least as since classes were underway, we had students with assignments, we needed to direct them somewhere, since our.

215
00:38:15.210 --> 00:38:23.250
Erin McCaffrey: authentication was still down so we couldn't access, the majority of our license databases and many of our systems.

216
00:38:23.940 --> 00:38:38.370
Erin McCaffrey: As Romel described also we're externally hosted but because, quite a few of them had custom domain mapping to appear as if they were part of the campus domain, they remained inaccessible to us.

217
00:38:39.240 --> 00:38:53.940
Erin McCaffrey: So, once we got to about mid September, we, the office 365 environment was made available to us, so we were able to set up a sharepoint site.

218
00:38:54.390 --> 00:39:02.430
Erin McCaffrey: To provide alternative access to databases so myself and some of our other librarians started reaching out to vendors.

219
00:39:02.730 --> 00:39:11.370

Erin McCaffrey: Trying to determine what workarounds they might be able to provide for us to ensure that our faculty and staff could access those resources.

220
00:39:11.820 --> 00:39:23.730
Erin McCaffrey: So that that worked as a workaround but because of how that had to be configured we had to approve every request for access so Melissa and myself and many of our other colleagues.

221
00:39:24.120 --> 00:39:47.910
Erin McCaffrey: Were you know very rapidly monitoring those requests and improving them as they were coming in, we set up gmail accounts to use as an alternative way to contact the library in the interim, until we had access back to our university email system and then printing was a real issue.

222
00:39:49.170 --> 00:39:56.280
Erin McCaffrey: And i'm sorry I know this is a pain point for Melissa and myself, and any of our readers colleagues that might be in attendance today.

223
00:39:56.790 --> 00:40:04.320
Erin McCaffrey: So printing was restored and kind of a temporary fashion, so it required students to have.

224
00:40:04.710 --> 00:40:14.310
Erin McCaffrey: Their document on a flash drive that they would then literally plug into the printer and the document had to be a PDF and we had a lot of.

225
00:40:14.940 --> 00:40:20.400
Erin McCaffrey: challenges with students who just you know, had really no idea what a flash drive even was.

226
00:40:21.090 --> 00:40:31.350
Erin McCaffrey: On top of compatibility issues and such so there was a period of time where research help desk in particular was really just a printing support desk.

227
00:40:32.100 --> 00:40:40.470
Erin McCaffrey: So that was frustrating for staff and faculty in the library, it was frustrating for students, and you know we just did our best to help them.

228
00:40:41.160 --> 00:40:49.620
Erin McCaffrey: meet their needs at that point in time, we also faced some facility disruptions when the cyber attack occurred.

229
00:40:50.070 --> 00:41:01.980
Erin McCaffrey: So all of the security cameras in the library were down, so the first few weeks after the cyber attack, we had faculty and staff and shifts.

230
00:41:02.670 --> 00:41:10.350
Erin McCaffrey: At our one of our entrances just ensure are accessible entrance to ensure that if someone needed to get into building they could.

231
00:41:10.740 --> 00:41:22.260
Erin McCaffrey: And there's also a phone at that entrance, of course, the phones were down so eventually we created a Google phone number where they could call for access and we didn't have to have someone sitting at the door.

232
00:41:22.680 --> 00:41:39.210
Erin McCaffrey: and not a library service interruption necessarily but the student food pantry the campus student food pantry is located within our library building and the cyber attack just coincidentally also aligned with.

233
00:41:40.020 --> 00:41:45.540
Erin McCaffrey: Our remodeled cafeteria opening and meal plan options have changed, so we had a lot of students.

234
00:41:45.930 --> 00:41:54.930
Erin McCaffrey: That were a little caught off guard at the changes to the meal plans and we're wanting to have access to our student food pantry to get food, so we.

235
00:41:55.740 --> 00:42:08.220
Erin McCaffrey: Also in that first kind of two week window when things were still pretty disrupted and we're out here on campus but unsure what to do, we had library staff and faculty that were also sitting there.

236
00:42:08.790 --> 00:42:24.270

Erin McCaffrey: and helping out our colleagues that run the food pantry to ensure that students had access there, it was not until mid October that probably about half of the Faculty and staff computers have been scanned and restored.

237
00:42:25.290 --> 00:42:31.200
Erin McCaffrey: and probably about half of the classroom and lab computers were restored by that point.

238
00:42:32.250 --> 00:42:44.100
Erin McCaffrey: In terms of other library service disruptions it wasn't until March of 2020 so again, our cyber attack happened late August 2019 it was not until March of 2020.

239
00:42:45.180 --> 00:42:53.430
Erin McCaffrey: That our interlibrary loan system was restored and then around that same time was when restoration began.

240
00:42:53.790 --> 00:43:02.070
Erin McCaffrey: For a reserve system and then that was further delayed and disrupted, because of the pandemic and Campus closing and then.

241
00:43:02.670 --> 00:43:18.510
Erin McCaffrey: The IT staff that had been working with us on that had to shift their time to ensuring that faculty and staff had what they needed to work remotely so it wasn't until the summer of 2020 that we had full access back to our reserve system so.

242
00:43:20.130 --> 00:43:35.220
Erin McCaffrey: The the recovery was a long process, because our institutions chose to rebuild, but then having the pandemic come into play and added on to that it made it some things take even longer to be restored.

243
00:43:39.000 --> 00:43:47.580
Melissa DeWitt: Thank you Erin and thank you panel we've been we've been through it and so that kind of brings us to our next question and then just.

244
00:43:48.060 --> 00:43:55.740
Melissa DeWitt: For panelists folks and we have about 15 minutes until we are looking at the end with about two more questions so keep that in mind too.

245
00:43:56.400 --> 00:44:08.700
Melissa DeWitt: But I do want to touch on this and very interested in your response to this question, and because we have our theme of service continuity and services don't happen without people.

246
00:44:09.420 --> 00:44:19.320
Melissa DeWitt: And the Labor and the work that goes into providing those services and what you're describing is a really stressful really challenging work environment.

247
00:44:19.770 --> 00:44:37.350
Melissa DeWitt: And so, thinking about that can you describe the emotional impact on you, maybe you personally other employees at your institution either during or following the events and we have a little change in the order again i'm going to have Kristina go first with this one.

248
00:44:38.070 --> 00:44:41.250
Kristina Vela Bisbee: yeah and i'll try to keep things brief.

249
00:44:42.510 --> 00:44:57.690
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So there were sort of like three feelings that came up to mind, for me, one is all next was like feelings of sort of like embarrassment or like face threatening vibes and then sort of frustrations around visibility.

250
00:44:59.040 --> 00:45:08.220
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So this was sort of the first--I've been working in libraries, since 2015--but this was sort of the first moment in this current position that I'm in where.

251
00:45:08.760 --> 00:45:19.830
Kristina Vela Bisbee: I really felt like my actions and the choices that I made were going to have consequences that were larger than the institution that I was serving and the users, that I was working with.

252
00:45:21.000 --> 00:45:30.060
Kristina Vela Bisbee: It really sort of reinforced in me the power of information that we provide, especially at sort of these larger institutions.

253
00:45:30.600 --> 00:45:44.190

Kristina Vela Bisbee: It really does more than just reinforce the education cycle of knowledge that we're a part of in our own little bubbles, and they really do have real world impacts, so that was that was the first thing that came to mind.

254
00:45:45.180 --> 00:45:56.130
Kristina Vela Bisbee: I also felt really responsible because because my name was being invoked in a lot of these these calls I somehow felt responsible.

255
00:45:56.730 --> 00:46:10.350
Kristina Vela Bisbee: Which is really weird right because it's not like I I did anything to sort of spur these attacks, but because I was being called upon in that way, it was you know pretty face threatening.

256
00:46:11.070 --> 00:46:23.310
Kristina Vela Bisbee: And then, finally, there was frustration around visibility right people were like people were concerned, but I was really concerned, it was my name that they were using like we need to nip this in the bud now.

257
00:46:24.120 --> 00:46:28.380
Kristina Vela Bisbee: And the process of that of which it took for us to cancel which included.

258
00:46:28.950 --> 00:46:38.010
Kristina Vela Bisbee: You know, taking statistics about usage and pulling faculty and talking with students about you know what would be an acceptable alternative.

259
00:46:38.610 --> 00:46:48.870
Kristina Vela Bisbee: All of those things sort of took time and I don't think that it was addressed with the same kind of urgency that I thought should have been you know should or could have been done.

260
00:46:52.170 --> 00:46:57.990
Melissa DeWitt: Thank you definitely understandable emotions, I am sorry you felt that way throughout that whole process.

261
00:46:59.400 --> 00:47:03.000
Melissa DeWitt: i'm going to turn it over to Erin next for the same question.

262
00:47:06.060 --> 00:47:16.170
Erin McCaffrey: um I you know there were a lot of in terms of emotional impacts feelings of frustration just not being able.

263
00:47:16.650 --> 00:47:24.960
Erin McCaffrey: I think, mostly stemming from not being able to serve our students in the way and in the quality and manner in which we.

264
00:47:25.470 --> 00:47:35.970
Erin McCaffrey: Typically, would and are known for doing so i'm all of the library employees really went above and beyond, to try to provide that continuity.

265
00:47:36.390 --> 00:47:46.050
Erin McCaffrey: To students but um you know it was definitely very frustrating at the time of the cyber attack, I was about four months into.

266
00:47:46.320 --> 00:47:56.430
Erin McCaffrey: serving as our interim Dean so Personally, I really focused on disseminating information and communicating as much as I could to.

267
00:47:56.760 --> 00:48:07.500
Erin McCaffrey: The library staff and faculty and then taking their questions and concerns up to our provost our provost held daily initially daily updates.

268
00:48:08.430 --> 00:48:13.860
Erin McCaffrey: She would come together at noon every day in our cafeteria to share information with.

269
00:48:14.280 --> 00:48:21.630
Erin McCaffrey: faculty and staff across academic affairs and then she would collect questions and concerns and take them back to our CIO.

270
00:48:22.080 --> 00:48:34.470
Erin McCaffrey: And as time went on, and those went from daily updates to twice a week to then weekly, but she I appreciate her efforts to ensure there were some communication channels, because again.

271
00:48:34.980 --> 00:48:43.920

Erin McCaffrey: Initially, the emphasis was on anything that was you know student facing so that courses could start in the fall as planned, but as time went on.

272
00:48:44.190 --> 00:48:54.960
Erin McCaffrey: You know we're all basically competing for time and attention from our university it department for other systems are lingering issues, so I also felt like.

273
00:48:55.980 --> 00:49:07.950
Erin McCaffrey: I was spending a lot of time advocating for our needs, but that was good, as well, because it created more awareness across the University of some of our services and just the impact.

274
00:49:08.940 --> 00:49:16.260
Erin McCaffrey: On our students and our faculty when they're not available and um you know also.

275
00:49:16.950 --> 00:49:26.130
Erin McCaffrey: there's no easy--in just thinking about connecting with family or friends outside of this and trying to talk about this experience--I mean there's really no.

276
00:49:26.610 --> 00:49:35.100
Erin McCaffrey: easy way to kind of succinctly explain what you're going through, I remember being at a Barbecue and trying to talk to a friend just about like the scale of what.

277
00:49:35.550 --> 00:49:49.560
Erin McCaffrey: We were dealing with, and it was immense and when you really think about Okay, I have no phone at work, I have no computer I you know all those things that we rely on so much on a day to day basis and there.

278
00:49:50.520 --> 00:50:03.270
Erin McCaffrey: was also real frustration at having to use personal devices for as long as we did we had employees that reached the limits on personal data plans and those first two weeks or so after the attack.

279
00:50:03.990 --> 00:50:10.620
Erin McCaffrey: You know a lot of us had we brought in our own personal computers, but they were old and slow to run and.

280
00:50:11.310 --> 00:50:18.480
Erin McCaffrey: So there eventually we purchase some chromebooks in the library that we made sure every department had access to so at least we could.

281
00:50:18.840 --> 00:50:28.830
Erin McCaffrey: use those in the interim once wireless access had been restored on campus but before we all had our university computers back so it was.

282
00:50:29.610 --> 00:50:44.160
Erin McCaffrey: It was an exhausting time for sure, but I'm very proud of how we all came together and supported each other during that window and then you know again continue to serve our students to the best of our ability.

283
00:50:47.010 --> 00:51:01.290
Melissa DeWitt: Thank you Erin your bbq story resonates with me deeply felt like all I was talking about in my spare time and no one got it and Romel, could you talk us through emotional impacts from your situation as well.

284
00:51:01.800 --> 00:51:09.300
Romel Espinel: For I think I have this stages of campus wide cyber attack, so one there's shock.

285
00:51:09.930 --> 00:51:28.200
Romel Espinel: shock in that attack and shut down normal everyday mundane operations even like calling someone up on the phone in their office everything came to a halt and it's just that shock that you know you know you hear about cyber attacks and you don't know kind of the little.

286
00:51:29.250 --> 00:51:43.470
Romel Espinel: Harm they could do, besides the bigger harms second the uncertainty, you know questions like when when things get back to normal or the powers that be resolving the issue, how can we have the better protected by this.

287
00:51:44.700 --> 00:51:54.600
Romel Espinel: You know when when our when our own systems going to get back so that we can give the service back to the students, so that they could you know, so that they can be successful, or what they're doing.

288
00:51:55.530 --> 00:52:04.200
Romel Espinel: Third, is like frustrations and sometimes anger, you know why haven't they resolve this what was what would the emergency plans in case of an attack.

289
00:52:04.650 --> 00:52:10.470
Romel Espinel: Why doesn't it have an administrative password to my computer I can't get into why can't why can't I to.

290
00:52:10.920 --> 00:52:19.200
Romel Espinel: find my computer, because actually you know, there was a computer that was lost in this and kind of like the chaos that that existed during this thing, and lastly.

291
00:52:19.620 --> 00:52:31.230
Romel Espinel: there's still uncertainty right, you know that resonates for a very long time, I think it's so resonates is like, how can we we be ready for the next attack will be ready.

292
00:52:32.970 --> 00:52:41.580
Romel Espinel: You know, and just to make a note, you know, like I said before in the beginning, is that we didn't really even get a chance to reflect upon how we can recover.

293
00:52:41.820 --> 00:52:55.860
Romel Espinel: Or how we can proceed forward after malware attacks, so that we can have systems in place so that, if this happens again, you know we can we can protect ourselves a little bit more just because the pandemic followed it right afterwards.

294
00:52:56.970 --> 00:53:05.280
Romel Espinel: Although I have to do say that having this malware attack preparedness for me, which is kind of a weird inter inter.

295
00:53:05.940 --> 00:53:15.780
Romel Espinel: connectedness of these crises, you know conjoined crises so yeah it's all those emotions that we're going that we were going through, because.

296
00:53:16.710 --> 00:53:28.410
Romel Espinel: We just want to we just want to help our students and our faculty and you know, like and everything's being held down by you

know technology, and you know how it can be held back by a cyber attack like this.

297
00:53:31.230 --> 00:53:37.920
Melissa DeWitt: Thank you, I took notes on the four stages of cyber attack and I really appreciate, like the even more uncertainty.

298
00:53:38.280 --> 00:53:46.380
Melissa DeWitt: And in in even, right, for me and maybe for some of us, the fear that it'll just happen again and are we going to be ready, or is it going to be this again.

299
00:53:47.100 --> 00:53:54.540
Melissa DeWitt: So I appreciate you sharing those insights to, and we are on to our fourth and final question for the panel.

300
00:53:55.320 --> 00:54:07.080
Melissa DeWitt: And one that I'm sure that folks in the audience are really curious about and we have the benefit of hindsight right and maybe haven't had a ton of time to reflect, but we do know some things now.

301
00:54:07.800 --> 00:54:24.210
Melissa DeWitt: What do you all think libraries or institutions such as our universities can have in place in the event that they experienced a cyber attack, maybe thinking about what would have been helpful for us, had we had that in place, and so I will start with Erin.

302
00:54:25.590 --> 00:54:31.590
Erin McCaffrey: So our library had a disaster plan in place prior to the cyber attack.

303
00:54:32.550 --> 00:54:41.760
Erin McCaffrey: which was primarily focused on concerns related to physical collections and physical space we did have an appendix.

304
00:54:42.180 --> 00:54:51.840
Erin McCaffrey: focused on technology so some information for which systems, you know, had servers on campus and some vendor contact information but.

305
00:54:52.350 --> 00:55:06.060

Erin McCaffrey: really not anything on the scale of what we needed done once we had been through the cyber attack, so we are collecting information and trying to update that plan to reflect both.

306
00:55:06.600 --> 00:55:17.580
Erin McCaffrey: Lessons learned from the cyber attack and then the pandemic as well, and we also had you know things like a backup of our agency database list.

307
00:55:18.600 --> 00:55:25.410
Erin McCaffrey: That had the proxy URLs in it, but because our campus authentication was rebuilt that didn't.

308
00:55:26.310 --> 00:55:37.920
Erin McCaffrey: Those proxy URLs weren't working because the authentication had to be rebuilt so that's why we ended up doing that direct vendor outreach to try to create alternate access.

309
00:55:38.670 --> 00:55:52.290
Erin McCaffrey: for a period of time until authentication was restored the majority of the hardware and the library is managed by our university IT department and part of that overall campus.

310
00:55:52.650 --> 00:56:04.980
Erin McCaffrey: technology infrastructure, so I know I would like more clarity going forward just what is our institutional continuity plan for the you know when we might face this again.

311
00:56:05.400 --> 00:56:14.340
Erin McCaffrey: So that we can ensure that we're prepared for that side of it, too, and then just on more of the the people, the human element here.

312
00:56:15.120 --> 00:56:24.240
Erin McCaffrey: Make sure that you have you know, a communication chain established for emergencies I just began by you know texting.

313
00:56:24.990 --> 00:56:34.290
Erin McCaffrey: Our leadership team and then asking them to pass those messages on via text to the folks in their departments and then eventually we were able to expand other.

314
00:56:34.620 --> 00:56:49.020

Erin McCaffrey: methods of communication, but in that first week it was just really you know anything we could use to communicate with each other, we did just to make sure folks were informed as to what was going on, but like Romel said too.

315
00:56:49.830 --> 00:56:55.110
Erin McCaffrey: You know I know personally in preparing for this panel today it's really given me the space to.

316
00:56:55.470 --> 00:57:03.870
Erin McCaffrey: kind of step back a little bit and do a little more reflection on what we actually went through and the hope this summer that we can document more of that.

317
00:57:04.560 --> 00:57:14.100
Erin McCaffrey: For whenever we likely will find ourselves, probably in something hopefully not on the scale in the future, but the attacks continue, so we need to be prepared.

318
00:57:17.010 --> 00:57:29.580
Melissa DeWitt: Thank you Erin fingers crossed we get a little respite before another crisis, hopefully there just isn't another one, but you know um let's go to Romel for some thoughts.

319
00:57:30.510 --> 00:57:36.210
Romel Espinel: yeah you know, like i'll get to like they say like technological recommendations, I think.

320
00:57:36.660 --> 00:57:48.300
Romel Espinel: You know I think cyber attacks are going to continue happening, especially at universities, I think there was an article just recently inside higher ED about how universities are just prime targets.

321
00:57:48.990 --> 00:57:59.250
Romel Espinel: For for cyber attacks, just because they contain so much personal information and they're they're such big organizations and have IT infrastructures that could be vulnerable to attacks.

322
00:57:59.640 --> 00:58:08.520
Romel Espinel: And that brand some where you know ransomware attacks are becoming higher that even in the ransoms are starting to double even from say.

323
00:58:10.170 --> 00:58:24.060
Romel Espinel: So so but, as these crisis build up I think it's important that libraries, you know start reflecting upon especially coming out of the pandemic of what crisis and what we want to guarantee and what our values are.

324
00:58:24.630 --> 00:58:32.010
Romel Espinel: so that we know what we want to guarantee to our our students and our faculty and to our Community, because.

325
00:58:32.970 --> 00:58:42.900
Romel Espinel: Right now, I'm reading the shock doctrine by Naomi Klein, and so, like a way to take out, you know to be opportunist is you know, like as we've seen in like historical.

326
00:58:43.230 --> 00:58:54.600
Romel Espinel: Instances just recently, is that you know saying Katrina you see the total wiping away of a city and then you get rid of the education system and you replace it with privatization.

327
00:58:55.530 --> 00:59:02.970
Romel Espinel: And sometimes those you know that what's being new and innovative isn't in the best interest for our communities so.

328
00:59:03.450 --> 00:59:19.230
Romel Espinel: that's what we have to be really careful of as well, as you know, building these infrastructures that are going to protect us, you know, like having a backup wi fi you know backup wi fi or having you know, whatever proposed with you know easy backup easy proxy.

329
00:59:20.280 --> 00:59:24.210
Romel Espinel: systems so that we can always keep these things online.

330
00:59:25.200 --> 00:59:30.540
Romel Espinel: And also send up a good communication structure, I think we were actually lucky that we have a good.

331
00:59:30.780 --> 00:59:39.840
Romel Espinel: At Stephens we have a good communications between all the departments on social media, especially Instagram so we're always kind of communicating with our students through through there.

332

00:59:40.380 --> 00:59:43.110
Romel Espinel: Because you really don't have access to a lot of.

333
00:59:43.920 --> 00:59:54.450
Romel Espinel: Technology, you know you can't really call anybody, and like like Erin said about text messaging one of the main thing the first things that we did was collect everybody's phone numbers, you know because.

334
00:59:54.750 --> 00:59:59.130
Romel Espinel: We never got in touch with people on their personal devices or phones so.

335
00:59:59.940 --> 01:00:15.180
Romel Espinel: Those are things that you know could always be helpful for this, but uh you know, knowing who we are, what our community needs is really important, and not to get lost in you know, like hey let's build up the new now you know and and that new might not be the best thing for our communities.

336
01:00:18.690 --> 01:00:34.440
Melissa DeWitt: Thank you, I think you had some really great suggestions and then I hear both of you mentioning right communication as this really important aspect throughout as well, and then finally Kristina any final thoughts on what this could look like for other folks.

337
01:00:35.400 --> 01:00:45.960
Kristina Vela Bisbee: So I'll keep it short and sweet number one protect your IP range don't... don't publish that on your website just... just tell it to the people who need to know.

338
01:00:47.280 --> 01:00:54.990
Kristina Vela Bisbee: Number two plan for the next attack not just the one that you've already had, so these attacks are just going to get more sophisticated.

339
01:00:55.950 --> 01:01:06.450
Kristina Vela Bisbee: Work with your partners on campus who are already thinking about these things, there are experts that are there and available and would probably love to talk and have a voice in that conversation at your institution.

340
01:01:07.470 --> 01:01:10.470

Kristina Vela Bisbee: And then, finally, this one is sort of specific to mine.

341
01:01:12.540 --> 01:01:23.730
Kristina Vela Bisbee: take responsibility for the content in your collections, I think a lot of times we are so focused on providing access we don't really think about what the impact is of what's actually in those collections.

342
01:01:24.390 --> 01:01:37.890
Kristina Vela Bisbee: And ultimately, if we cannot account for the risk associated with that material, I think a larger question should be had about whether the library is the appropriate place to be providing that content so just a.

343
01:01:40.350 --> 01:01:42.210
Kristina Vela Bisbee: Ending on a real like happy note there.

344
01:01:45.570 --> 01:01:59.310
Melissa DeWitt: Thank you all of this has been incredibly uplifting so but really informational this has been great because I want to say thank you to everyone on this panel today for sharing your stories and for processing.

345
01:02:00.450 --> 01:02:10.080
Melissa DeWitt: This information and talking about the impact and educating others who may or may not have had these experiences as well, I think this is so important.

346
01:02:10.590 --> 01:02:18.480
Melissa DeWitt: So I really appreciate that you all were here today, I am going to turn this over to Lisa for some final remarks.

347
01:02:18.960 --> 01:02:30.870
Melissa DeWitt: I know we're at time, so if folks are able to hang out for just a few minutes, we would love to kind of close out and also maybe address one or two questions um and with that I will have Lisa take it over.

348
01:02:32.760 --> 01:02:41.460
Lisa Janicke Hinchliffe: Great! Thank you, Melissa for doing such a great job moderating and if you wouldn't mind putting on the next slide right now as well um I think.

349
01:02:42.120 --> 01:02:53.340
Lisa Janicke Hinchliffe: there's been a few questions, but actually as i've been monitoring them I think they've actually been answered, for the most part, as you've kind of gone through the progression so since we are at time I think we'll.

350
01:02:53.730 --> 01:03:11.430
Lisa Janicke Hinchliffe: just turn to mentioning that there will be some follow on opportunities sponsored by SNSI, particularly looking at: Okay, now that maybe we've realized that maybe we didn't realize before the kind of thing that could happen to us.

351
01:03:12.540 --> 01:03:16.860
Lisa Janicke Hinchliffe: I know I feel really stressed out now and I didn't even go through this myself so.

352
01:03:17.790 --> 01:03:25.650
Lisa Janicke Hinchliffe: We should stress test this library service continuity plans for cyber security events and so some upcoming opportunities to think about this more in.

353
01:03:26.160 --> 01:03:33.930
Lisa Janicke Hinchliffe: A hands on way, I want to also mention that we will be making this recording available, as well as.

354
01:03:34.290 --> 01:03:43.020
Lisa Janicke Hinchliffe: A number of people have mentioned that you know the transcript was would be really helpful we're going to read that over just to correct anything before we post that as well.

355
01:03:43.710 --> 01:03:50.190
Lisa Janicke Hinchliffe: I want to also thank our translator, who has made this content accessible to the Spanish speaking attendees.

356
01:03:51.180 --> 01:04:09.300
Lisa Janicke Hinchliffe: Thank you so much to Choice for arranging this wonderful technology and Platform and registration system to our almost 300 attendees who were with us here today and to SNSI for sponsoring this session, I wish you all a wonderful day, thank you.